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IDAHO PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE)
APPLICATION OF ROCKY) **CASE NO. PAC-E-07-05**
MOUNTAIN POWER FOR)
APPROVAL OF CHANGES TO ITS) **Direct Testimony of Bruce N. Williams**
ELECTRIC SERVICE SCHEDULES)
)

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

CASE NO. PAC-E-07-05

June 2007

1 **Q. Please state your name, business address and present position with the**
2 **Company (also referred to as Rocky Mountain Power).**

3 A. My name is Bruce N. Williams. My business address is 825 NE Multnomah,
4 Suite 1900, Portland, Oregon 97232. I am the Vice President and Treasurer for
5 the Company.

6 **Qualifications**

7 **Q. Please briefly describe your education and business experience.**

8 A. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration with a
9 concentration in Finance from Oregon State University in June 1980. I also
10 received the Chartered Financial Analyst designation upon passing the
11 examination in September 1986. I have been employed by the Company for 22
12 years. My business experience has included financing of the Company's electric
13 operations and non-utility activities, investment management, and investor
14 relations.

15 **Q. Please describe your present duties.**

16 A. I am responsible for the Company's treasury, credit risk management, pension
17 and other investment management activities. In this proceeding, I am responsible
18 for the preparation of the Company's embedded cost of debt and preferred equity,
19 and the testimony related to capital structure.

20 **Purpose of Testimony**

21 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

22 A. I will first present a financing overview of the Company. Next, I will discuss the
23 planned amounts of common equity, debt, and preferred stock to be included in

1 the Company's capital structure. I will then analyze the embedded cost of debt
2 and preferred stock supporting Rocky Mountain Power's electric operations in the
3 state of Idaho as of March 2007, with anticipated changes through December
4 2007. This analysis includes the known and measurable changes to the debt and
5 preferred stock portfolios and capital contributions from our parent company.

6 **Q. What financial information is your analysis based on?**

7 A. The historical test period used in this case is the twelve months ending December
8 2006, updated with known and measurable changes. To match Rocky Mountain
9 Power's cost as closely as possible with customers' rates, the capital structure
10 applied in this case is the Company's actual capital structure as of March 31,
11 2007, with known and measurable changes occurring through December 31,
12 2007. This time period captures significant transactions between the end of the
13 historical test period and the beginning of the rate effective period. Rocky
14 Mountain Power believes it is appropriate to include these transactions in this
15 proceeding as it reflects ongoing capital costs to fund operations. As I discuss
16 later, I propose changes to remove long-term debt and preferred stock that will
17 mature or is subject to mandatory redemption prior to December 31, 2007.

18 **Q. What is the overall cost of capital that Rocky Mountain Power is proposing**
19 **in this proceeding?**

20 A. Rocky Mountain Power is proposing an overall cost of capital of 8.52 percent.
21 This cost includes the return on equity recommendation from Dr. Sam Hadaway
22 and the following capital structure and costs:

1 **Rocky Mountain Power**

2 **Overall Cost of Capital**

3

4	Component	Percent of Total	Cost	Weighted Average
5	Long Term Debt	49.1%	6.26%	3.07%
6	Preferred Stock	0.5%	5.41%	.03%
7	Common Stock Equity	<u>50.4%</u>	10.75%	<u>5.42%</u>
8		100.0%		8.52%

9 **Financing Overview**

10 **Q. How does the Company finance its electric utility operations?**

11 A. The Company finances the cash flow requirements of its regulated utility
12 operations through a mix of debt and equity securities designed to provide a
13 competitive cost of capital and predictable capital market access.

14 **Q. How does the Company meet its debt and preferred equity financing
15 requirements?**

16 A. The Company relies on a mix of first mortgage bonds, other secured debt, tax
17 exempt debt and preferred stock to meet its long-term debt and preferred stock
18 financing requirements. The Company has concluded the majority of its long-
19 term financing utilizing secured first mortgage bonds issued under the Mortgage
20 Indenture dated January 9, 1989. Exhibit No. 7 shows that, as of December 31,
21 2007, the Company will have approximately \$3.8 billion of first mortgage bonds
22 outstanding, with an average cost of 6.55 percent and average remaining maturity
23 of 16 years. Presently, all outstanding first mortgage bonds bear interest at fixed

1 rates. Proceeds from the issuance of the first mortgage bonds (and other financing
2 instruments) are used to finance the combined utility operations across the
3 Company's six-state service territory.

4 Another important source of financing has been the tax-exempt financing
5 associated with certain qualifying equipment at power generation plants. Under
6 arrangements with local counties and other tax-exempt entities, the Company
7 borrows the proceeds and guarantees the repayment of the long-term debt in order
8 to take advantage of their tax-exempt status in financings. As of December 31,
9 2007, the Company's tax-exempt portfolio will be \$738 million in principal
10 amount which had an average cost of 4.74 percent at March 31, 2007 (which
11 includes the cost of issuance and credit enhancement).

12 **Capital Structure**

13 **Q. How does the Company determine the amount of common equity, debt, and
14 preferred stock to be included in the planned capital structure?**

15 A. As a regulated utility, Rocky Mountain Power has a duty and an obligation to
16 provide adequate, efficient, just and reasonable service to customers in its Idaho
17 service territory while balancing cost and risk. In order to fulfill this obligation,
18 Rocky Mountain Power must make significant capital expenditures for plant and
19 network maintenance, power generation and delivery infrastructure, clean air
20 investments, hydro re-licensing and other activities. Through its planning
21 process, the Company determined the amounts of new financing needed to
22 support these activities and calculated the required equity and debt ratios required
23 to maintain our current 'A-' credit rating for senior secured debt. These

1 determinations are then reflected in the Company's budget.

2 **Q. Have the Company's recent actions and budgets reflected an expectation that**
3 **the capital structure will include an increase in equity?**

4 A. Yes. Following the acquisition by MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company on
5 March 21, 2006, the Company has received a total of \$215 million of cash capital
6 contributions from its direct parent company, PPW Holdings, LLC. Similarly, the
7 Company's 2007 budget includes additional cash equity contributions of \$150
8 million prior to June 30, 2007.

9 **Q. Why does the Company's budget reflect the need for additional equity in the**
10 **capital structure?**

11 A. The budget reflects the cost increases described in this case, including fuel, net
12 power costs, certain labor related costs, investment in major supply side
13 resources, thermal plant maintenance, hydro re-licensing and clean air
14 requirements. These cost increases, coupled with the increasingly more rigorous
15 expectations of the credit rating agencies for credit metrics and balance sheet
16 strength, mean that additional equity will be required along with improved
17 business results and other considerations to support the Company's current 'A-'
18 credit rating from Standard & Poor's, its 'A3' rating from Moody's Investors
19 Service ("Moody's"), and to prevent Fitch Ratings from further downgrades, with
20 the last downgrade occurring in January 2006.

21 **Q. How does this projected capital structure match up to comparable electric**
22 **utilities?**

23 A. The projected capital structure is consistent with the comparable group that Dr.

1 Hadaway has selected in his estimate of return on equity. Both the Company and
2 the group of comparable companies show an increasing percentage of common
3 equity in their capital structures. The Value Line estimate of common equity ratio
4 for the comparable group averages 50.0 percent.

5 **Q. Please describe the changes to the Company's levels of debt financing.**

6 A. Through the period ending December 31, 2007, the balance of the outstanding
7 long-term debt will change through maturities, principal amortization and sinking
8 fund requirements. Based upon the long-term debt series outstanding on March
9 31, 2007, I have calculated the reduction to the outstanding balances for
10 maturities, principal amortization and sinking fund requirements, which are
11 scheduled to occur during the period ending December 31, 2007. The total long-
12 term debt maturities and principal amortized over this period is \$119.9 million.
13 The resulting \$4.5 billion of long-term debt is consistent with the Company's
14 budget and is necessary to fund our ongoing operations. At this time the
15 Company has no plans to issue additional long-term debt prior to December 31,
16 2007.

17 **Q. Please describe the changes to the Company's level of preferred equity**
18 **financing.**

19 A. For preferred stock, I started with the balance outstanding at March 31, 2007, and
20 made a reduction of \$37.5 million of preferred stock to reflect the final sinking
21 fund requirement of the \$7.48 No Par Serial Preferred stock series that will occur
22 on June 15, 2007.

1 **Q. Is the proposed capital structure consistent with the Company's current**
2 **credit rating?**

3 A. Yes. This planned capital structure is intended to enable the Company to deliver
4 its budgeted capital expenditures while maintaining credit ratios that support the
5 continuance of its current 'A-' credit rating.

6 **Q. What is the relationship between a strong credit rating and customer**
7 **benefits?**

8 A. The credit rating assigned to a utility by the credit rating agencies directly affects
9 the price the utility pays to attract the capital necessary to support its current and
10 future operating needs. A strong credit rating directly benefits customers by
11 reducing immediate and future borrowing costs related to the financing needed to
12 support regulatory operations.

13 During periods of capital market disruptions, higher-rated companies are
14 more likely to have continuous, uninterrupted access to capital. This is not
15 always the case with lower-rated companies, which during such periods may find
16 themselves either unable to secure capital or able to secure capital only on
17 unfavorable terms and conditions.

18 In addition, higher-rated companies have greater access to the long-term
19 markets for power and fuel purchases and sales. Such access provides these
20 companies with more alternatives when attempting to meet the current and future
21 load requirements of their customers. Finally, a company with strong ratings will
22 often avoid having to meet costly collateral requirements that are typically
23 imposed on lower-rated companies when securing power or fuel in these markets.

1 **Q. Is the Company subject to rating agency debt imputation associated with**
2 **Purchased Power Agreements?**

3 A. Yes. Rating agencies and financial analysts consider Purchased Power
4 Agreements to be debt-like and will impute debt and related interest when
5 calculating financial ratios.

6 For example, Standard & Poor's will adjust published results and add in
7 debt and interest resulting from purchase power agreements when assessing the
8 Company's creditworthiness. They do so in order to obtain a more accurate
9 assessment of a company's financial commitments and fixed payments. Exhibit
10 No. 8 is the May 12, 2003 publication by Standard & Poor's detailing its view of
11 the debt aspects of purchase power agreements which was refined by their March
12 30, 2007 publication (Exhibit No. 9).

13 **Q. How does this impact Rocky Mountain Power?**

14 A. During a recent ratings review, Standard & Poor's evaluated the Company's
15 purchase power agreements and other related long-term commitments. Following
16 this review, Standard & Poor's added approximately \$537 million of additional
17 debt and related interest expense to our leverage and coverage tests due to
18 PacifiCorp's purchase power agreements.

19 **Financing Cost Calculation**

20 **Q. How did you calculate the Company's embedded costs of long-term debt and**
21 **preferred stock?**

22 A. I calculated the embedded costs of debt and preferred stock using the
23 methodology relied upon in the Company's previous rate filings in Idaho and

1 elsewhere.

2 **Q. Please explain the cost of debt calculation.**

3 A. I calculated the cost of debt by issue, based on each debt series' interest rate and
4 net proceeds at the issuance date, to produce a bond yield to maturity for each
5 series of debt. It should be noted that in the event a bond was issued to refinance
6 a higher cost bond, the pre-tax premium and unamortized costs, if any, associated
7 with the refinancing were subtracted from the net proceeds of the bonds that were
8 issued. The bond yield was then multiplied by the principal amount outstanding of
9 each debt issue, resulting in an annualized cost of each debt issue. Aggregating
10 the annual cost of each debt issue produces the total annualized cost of debt.
11 Dividing the total annualized cost of debt by the total principal amount of debt
12 outstanding produces the weighted average cost for all debt issues. This is the
13 Company's embedded cost of long-term debt.

14 **Q. How did you calculate the embedded cost of preferred stock?**

15 A. The embedded cost of preferred stock was calculated by first determining the cost
16 of money for each issue. This is the result of dividing the annual dividend rate by
17 the per share net proceeds for each series of preferred stock. The cost associated
18 with each series was then multiplied by the total par or stated value outstanding
19 for each issue to yield the annualized cost for each issue. The sum of annualized
20 costs for each issue produces the total annual cost for the entire preferred stock
21 portfolio. I then divided the total annual cost by the total amount of preferred
22 stock outstanding to produce the weighted average cost of all issues. This is the
23 Company's embedded cost of preferred stock.

1 **Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt**

2 **Q. What is the Company's embedded cost of long-term debt?**

3 A. Exhibit No. 7 shows the embedded cost of long-term debt at March 31, 2007,
4 adjusted for the known and measurable changes discussed above to be 6.26
5 percent.

6 **Embedded Cost of Preferred Stock**

7 **Q. What is the Company's embedded cost of preferred stock?**

8 A. Exhibit No. 10 shows the embedded cost of preferred stock at March 31, 2007,
9 adjusted for the known and measurable changes discussed above to be 5.41
10 percent.

11 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

12 A. Yes.

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Case No. PAC-E-07-05
Exhibit No. 7
Witness: Bruce N. Williams

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Bruce N. Williams

Pro Forma Cost of Long-Term Debt

June 2007

PACIFICORP

Electric Operations

Pro Forma Cost of Long-Term Debt Summary

December 31, 2007

LINE NO.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT CURRENTLY OUTSTANDING	ISSUANCE EXPENSES	REDEMPTION EXPENSES	NET PROCEEDS TO COMPANY	ANNUAL DEBT SERVICE COST	INTEREST RATE	ALL-IN COST	ORIG LIFE	YTM	LINE NO.
1											1
2	Total First Mortgage Bonds	\$3,784,835,000	(\$34,537,272)	(\$38,145,597)	\$3,712,152,131	\$247,986,033	6.33%	6.55%	21.8	16.0	2
3											3
4	Subtotal - Pollution Control Revenue Bonds secured by FMBs	\$400,470,000	(\$10,560,810)	(\$9,550,194)	\$380,358,996	\$18,967,516	4.39%	4.74%	28.0	13.5	4
5	Subtotal - Pollution Control Revenue Bonds	\$337,900,000	(\$4,294,232)	(\$7,621,229)	\$325,984,539	\$16,046,592	4.51%	4.75%	27.8	10.2	5
6	Total Pollution Control Revenue Bonds	\$738,370,000	(\$14,855,042)	(\$17,171,423)	\$706,343,535	\$35,014,109	4.45%	4.74%	27.9	12.0	6
7											7
8	Total Cost of Long Term Debt	\$4,523,205,000	(\$49,392,314)	(\$55,317,020)	\$4,418,495,666	\$283,000,142	6.02%	6.26%	22.8	15.3	8
9											9

PACIFICORP
Electric Operations
Proforma Cost of Long-Term Debt Detail
December 31, 2017

LINE NO.	INTEREST RATE	DESCRIPTION	ISSUANCE DATE	MATURITY DATE	ORIG LIFE	YTM	PRINCIPAL AMOUNT		NET PROCEEDS TO COMPANY			MONEY TO COMPANY	ANNUAL DEBT SERVICE COST	LINE NO.
							ORIGINAL ISSUE	CURRENTLY OUTSTANDING	ISSUANCE EXPENSES	REDEMPTION EXPENSES	DOLLAR AMOUNT			
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)
1		First Mortgage Bonds												
2	8.271%	C-U Series due thru Oct 2010	04/15/92	10/01/10	18	2	\$48,972,000	\$13,200,000	\$0	\$0	\$100,000	8.271%	\$1,091,772	1
3	7.978%	C-U Series due thru Oct 2011	04/15/92	10/01/11	18	2	\$4,422,000	\$1,469,000	\$0	\$0	\$100,000	7.978%	\$117,197	2
4	8.493%	C-U Series due thru Oct 2012	04/15/92	10/01/12	19	3	\$19,772,000	\$7,988,000	\$0	\$0	\$100,000	8.493%	\$678,421	3
5	8.797%	C-U Series due thru Oct 2013	04/15/92	10/01/13	19	3	\$16,203,000	\$7,542,000	\$0	\$0	\$100,000	8.797%	\$663,470	4
6	8.734%	C-U Series due thru Oct 2014	04/15/92	10/01/14	20	4	\$28,218,000	\$14,492,000	\$0	\$0	\$100,000	8.734%	\$1,265,431	5
7	8.294%	C-U Series due thru Oct 2015	04/15/92	10/01/15	20	5	\$46,946,000	\$25,697,000	\$0	\$0	\$100,000	8.294%	\$2,131,309	6
8	8.635%	C-U Series due thru Oct 2016	04/15/92	10/01/16	21	5	\$18,750,000	\$11,159,000	\$0	\$0	\$100,000	8.635%	\$963,580	7
9	8.470%	C-U Series due thru Oct 2017	04/15/92	10/01/17	22	6	\$19,609,000	\$12,288,000	\$0	\$0	\$100,000	8.470%	\$1,040,794	8
10	8.475%	Subtotal - Amortizing FMBs			20	4	\$93,835,000	\$53,835,000	\$0	\$0	\$93,835,000	8.475%	\$7,952,273	9
11	4.300%	Series due Sep 2008	09/08/03	09/15/08	5	1	\$200,000,000	\$200,000,000	(\$1,610,660)	(\$5,967,819)	\$96,211	5.167%	\$10,334,000	10
12	6.900%	Series due Nov 2011	11/21/01	11/15/11	10	4	\$500,000,000	\$500,000,000	(\$5,338,849)	\$0	\$96,932	7.051%	\$35,255,000	11
13	5.450%	Series due Sep 2013	09/08/03	09/15/13	10	6	\$200,000,000	\$200,000,000	(\$1,654,660)	(\$5,967,819)	\$96,189	5.961%	\$11,922,000	12
14	4.950%	Series due Aug 2014	08/24/04	08/15/14	10	7	\$200,000,000	\$200,000,000	(\$2,170,365)	\$0	\$98,915	5.090%	\$10,180,000	13
15	7.000%	Series due Nov 2031	11/21/01	11/15/31	30	24	\$300,000,000	\$300,000,000	(\$3,701,310)	\$0	\$98,766	7.807%	\$23,421,000	14
16	5.250%	Series due Aug 2034	08/24/04	08/15/34	30	27	\$200,000,000	\$200,000,000	(\$2,614,365)	\$0	\$98,693	5.994%	\$11,968,000	15
17	6.100%	Series due Jun 2035	06/08/05	06/15/35	30	27	\$300,000,000	\$300,000,000	(\$3,992,021)	(\$1,295,995)	\$98,237	5.369%	\$16,107,000	16
18	5.750%	Series due Aug 2036	08/10/06	08/01/36	30	29	\$350,000,000	\$350,000,000	(\$3,935,488)	\$0	\$98,876	6.183%	\$21,640,500	17
19	5.979%	Subtotal - Bullet FMBs	03/14/07	04/01/37	30	29	\$600,000,000	\$600,000,000	(\$25,791,718)	(\$13,231,634)	\$99,871	6.154%	\$175,401,500	18
20	9.150%	Series C due Aug 2011	08/09/91	08/09/11	20	4	\$8,000,000	\$8,000,000	(\$75,327)	\$0	\$99,058	9.254%	\$740,320	19
21	8.950%	Series C due Sep 2011	08/16/91	09/01/11	20	4	\$20,000,000	\$20,000,000	(\$132,118)	\$0	\$99,339	9.022%	\$1,804,400	20
22	8.920%	Series C due Sep 2011	08/16/91	09/01/11	20	4	\$20,000,000	\$20,000,000	(\$188,318)	\$0	\$99,058	9.022%	\$1,804,400	21
23	8.950%	Series C due Sep 2011	08/16/91	09/01/11	20	4	\$25,000,000	\$25,000,000	(\$175,398)	\$0	\$99,298	9.026%	\$2,256,500	22
24	8.290%	Series C due Dec 2011	12/31/91	12/30/11	20	4	\$3,000,000	\$3,000,000	(\$23,040)	(\$410,784)	\$85,539	9.972%	\$299,160	23
25	8.260%	Series C due Jan 2012	01/09/92	01/10/12	20	4	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	(\$7,649)	(\$136,928)	\$85,542	9.972%	\$99,380	24
26	8.280%	Series C due Jan 2012	01/10/92	01/10/12	20	4	\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000	(\$13,297)	(\$273,856)	\$85,642	9.947%	\$198,940	25
27	8.250%	Series C due Feb 2012	01/15/92	02/01/12	20	4	\$3,000,000	\$3,000,000	(\$22,946)	(\$410,784)	\$85,542	9.925%	\$297,750	26
28	8.530%	Series C due Dec 2021	12/16/91	12/16/21	30	14	\$15,000,000	\$15,000,000	(\$115,202)	(\$2,053,922)	\$85,539	10.066%	\$1,509,900	27
29	8.375%	Series C due Dec 2021	12/31/91	12/31/21	30	14	\$5,000,000	\$5,000,000	(\$38,400)	(\$684,641)	\$85,539	9.889%	\$494,450	28
30	8.260%	Series C due Jan 2022	01/08/92	01/07/22	30	14	\$5,000,000	\$5,000,000	(\$33,243)	(\$684,641)	\$85,542	9.745%	\$487,250	29
31	8.270%	Series C due Jan 2022	01/09/92	01/10/22	30	14	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000	(\$30,594)	(\$547,712)	\$85,542	9.768%	\$390,720	30
32	8.766%	Subtotal - Series C MTNs			23	6	\$111,000,000	\$111,000,000	(\$855,533)	(\$5,203,268)	\$104,941,200	9.354%	\$10,383,170	31
33	8.130%	Series E due Jan 2013	01/20/93	01/22/13	20	5	\$10,000,000	\$10,000,000	(\$75,827)	(\$671,687)	\$92,525	8.939%	\$893,900	32
34	8.050%	Series E due Sep 2022	09/18/92	09/18/22	30	15	\$15,000,000	\$15,000,000	(\$131,471)	(\$1,695,566)	\$87,820	9.258%	\$1,388,700	33
35	8.070%	Series E due Sep 2022	09/09/92	09/09/22	30	15	\$8,000,000	\$8,000,000	(\$70,118)	(\$904,302)	\$87,820	9.280%	\$742,400	34
36	8.110%	Series E due Sep 2022	09/11/92	09/09/22	30	15	\$12,000,000	\$12,000,000	(\$105,177)	(\$1,356,453)	\$87,820	9.325%	\$1,119,000	35
37	8.120%	Series E due Sep 2022	09/11/92	09/09/22	30	15	\$5,000,000	\$5,000,000	(\$48,288)	(\$561,887)	\$87,820	9.336%	\$468,000	36
38	8.050%	Series E due Sep 2022	09/14/92	09/14/22	30	15	\$10,000,000	\$10,000,000	(\$87,648)	(\$1,130,377)	\$87,820	9.258%	\$925,800	37
39	8.080%	Series E due Oct 2022	10/15/92	10/14/22	30	15	\$25,000,000	\$25,000,000	(\$208,198)	(\$2,061,627)	\$87,820	9.258%	\$2,238,250	38
40	8.080%	Series E due Oct 2022	10/15/92	10/14/22	30	15	\$25,000,000	\$25,000,000	(\$208,198)	(\$2,061,627)	\$87,820	9.258%	\$2,238,250	39
41	8.230%	Series E due Jan 2023	01/29/93	01/20/23	30	15	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000	\$51,229	(\$88,989)	\$99,056	8.316%	\$332,640	40
42	8.100%	Subtotal - Series E MTNs	01/20/93	01/20/23	30	15	\$55,000,000	\$55,000,000	(\$37,914)	(\$335,843)	\$92,525	8.951%	\$447,550	41
43	7.260%	Series F due Jul 2023	07/22/93	07/21/23	30	16	\$11,000,000	\$11,000,000	(\$100,622)	(\$589,062)	\$93,730	7.804%	\$858,440	42
44	7.260%	Series F due Jul 2023	07/22/93	07/21/23	30	16	\$27,000,000	\$27,000,000	(\$246,981)	(\$1,445,880)	\$93,730	7.804%	\$2,107,080	43
45	7.230%	Series F due Aug 2023	08/16/93	08/16/23	30	16	\$15,000,000	\$15,000,000	(\$137,211)	(\$268,624)	\$97,294	7.457%	\$1,118,550	44
46	7.240%	Series F due Aug 2023	08/16/93	08/16/23	30	16	\$30,000,000	\$30,000,000	(\$274,423)	(\$537,248)	\$97,294	7.467%	\$2,240,100	45

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Case No. PAC-E-07-05

Exhibit No. 8

Witness: Bruce N. Williams

IDAHO PUBLIC
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BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER


Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Bruce N. Williams

Standard & Poor's Utilities & Perspectives
May 12, 2003 Publication

June 2007

May 12, 2003

Vol. 12, No. 19



Standard & Poor's
**UTILITIES &
PERSPECTIVES**
GLOBAL UTILITIES RATING SERVICE

**Last Week's Rating
Reviews and Activity** 10

Did You Know?

World Energy Consumption
and Regional Carbon Dioxide
Emissions in 2001 10

**Last Week's
Financing Activity**

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**STANDARD
& POOR'S**

"Buy Versus Build": Debt Aspects of Purchased-Power Agreements

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services views electric utility purchased-power agreements (PPA) as debt-like in nature, and has historically capitalized these obligations on a sliding scale known as a "risk spectrum." Standard & Poor's applies a 0% to 100% "risk factor" to the net present value (NPV) of the PPA capacity payments, and designates this amount as the debt equivalent.

While determination of the appropriate risk factor takes several variables into consideration, including the economics of the power and regulatory treatment, the overwhelming factor in selecting a risk factor has been a distinction in the likelihood of payment by the buyer. Specifically, Standard & Poor's has divided the PPA universe into two broad categories: take-or-pay contracts (TOP; hell or high water) and take-and-pay contracts (TAP; performance based). To date, TAP contracts have been treated far more leniently (e.g., a lower risk factor is applied) than TOP contracts since failure of the seller to deliver energy, or perform, results in an attendant reduction in payment by the buyer. Thus, TAP contracts were deemed substantially less debt-like. In fact, the risk factor used for many TAP obligations has been as low as 5% or 10% as opposed to TOPs, which have been typically at least 50%.

Standard & Poor's originally published its purchased-power criteria in 1990, and updated it in 1993. Over the past decade, the industry underwent significant changes related to deregulation and acquired a history with regard to the performance and reliability of third-party generators. In general, independent generation has performed well; the likelihood of nondelivery—and thus release from the payment obligation—is low. As a result, Standard & Poor's believes that the distinction between TOPs and TAPs is minimal, the result being that the risk factor for TAPs will become more stringent. This article reiterates Standard & Poor's views on purchased power as a fixed obligation, how to quantify this risk, and the credit ramifications of purchasing power in light of updated observations.

Why Capitalize PPAs?

Standard & Poor's evaluates the benefits and risks of purchased power by adjusting a purchasing utility's reported financial statements to allow for more meaningful comparisons with utilities that build generation. Utilities that build typically finance construction with a mix of debt and equity. A utility that leases a power plant has entered into a debt transaction for that facility; a capital lease appears on the utility's balance sheet as debt. A PPA is a similar fixed commitment. When a utility enters into a long-term PPA with a fixed-cost component, it takes on financial risk. Furthermore, utilities are typically not financially compensated for the risks

they assume in purchasing power, as purchased power is usually recovered dollar-for-dollar as an operating expense.

As electricity deregulation has progressed in some countries, states, and regions, the line has blurred between traditional utilities, vertically integrated utilities, and merchant energy companies, all of which are in the generation business. A common contract that has emerged is the tolling agreement, which gives an energy merchant company the right to purchase power from a specific power plant. (see "Evaluating Debt Aspects of Power Tolling Agreements," published Aug. 26, 2002). The energy merchant, or toller, is typically responsible for procuring and delivering gas to the plant when it wants the plant to generate power. The power plant operator must maintain plant availability and produce electricity at a contractual heat rate. Thus, tolling contracts exhibit characteristics of both PPAs and leases. However, tollers are typically unregulated entities competing in a competitive marketplace. Standard & Poor's has determined that a 70% risk factor should be applied to the NPV of the fixed tolling payments, reflecting its assessment of the risks borne by the toller, which are:

- Fixed payments that cover debt financing of power plant (typically highly leveraged at about 70%),
- Commodity price of inputs,
- Energy sales (price and volume), and
- Counterparty risk.

Determining the Risk Factor for PPAs

Alternatively, most entities entering into long-term PPAs, as an alternative to building and owning power plants, continue to be regulated utilities. Observations over time indicate the high likelihood of performance on TAP commitments and, thus, the high likelihood that utilities must make fixed payments. However, Standard & Poor's believes that vertically integrated, regulated utilities are afforded greater protection in the recovery of PPAs, compared with the recovery of fixed tolling charges by merchant generators. There are two reasons for this. First, tariffs are typically set by regulators to recover costs. Second, most vertically integrated utilities continue to have captive customers and an obligation to serve. At a minimum, purchased power, similar to capital costs and fuel costs, is included in tariffs as a cost of service.

As a generic guideline for utilities with PPAs included as an operating expense in base tariffs, Standard & Poor's believes that a 50% risk factor is appropriate for long-term commitments (e.g. tenors greater than three years). This risk factor assumes adequate regulatory treatment, including recognition of the PPA in tariffs; otherwise a higher risk factor could be adopted to indicate greater risk of recovery. Standard & Poor's will apply a 50% risk factor to the capacity

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component of both TAP and TOP PPAs. Where the capacity component is not broken out separately, we will assume that 50% of the payment is the capacity payment. Furthermore, Standard & Poor's will take counterparty risk into account when considering the risk factor. If a utility relies on any individual seller for a material portion of its energy needs, the risk of nondelivery will be assessed. To the extent that energy is not delivered, the utility will be exposed to replacing this power, potentially at market rates that could be higher than contracted rates and potentially not recoverable in tariffs.

Standard & Poor's continues to view the recovery of purchased-power costs via a fuel-adjustment clause, as opposed to base tariffs, as a material risk mitigant. A monthly or quarterly adjustment mechanism would ensure dollar-for-dollar recovery of fixed payments without having to receive approval from regulators for changes in fuel costs. This is superior to base tariff treatment, where variations in volume sales could result in under-recovery if demand is sluggish or contracting. For utilities in supportive regulatory jurisdictions with a precedent for timely and full cost recovery of fuel and purchased-power costs, a risk factor of as low as 30% could be used. In certain cases, Standard & Poor's may consider a lower risk factor of 10% to 20% for distribution utilities where recovery of certain costs, including stranded assets, has been legislated. Qualifying facilities that are blessed by overarching federal legislation may also fall into this category. This situation would be more typical of a utility that is transitioning from a vertically integrated to a disaggregated distribution company. Still, it is unlikely that

no portion of a PPA would be capitalized (zero risk factor) under any circumstances.

The previous scenarios address how purchased power is quantified for a vertically integrated utility with a bundled tariff. However, as the industry transitions to disaggregation and deregulation, various hybrid models have emerged. For example, a utility can have a deregulated merchant energy subsidiary, which buys power and off-sells it to the regulated utility. The utility in turn passes this power through to customers via a fuel-adjustment mechanism. For the merchant entity, a 70% risk factor would likely be applied to such a TAP or tolling scheme. But for the utility, a 30% risk factor would be used. What would be the appropriate treatment here? In part, the decision would be driven by the ratings methodology for the family of companies. Starting from a consolidated perspective, Standard & Poor's would use a 30% risk factor to calculate one debt equivalent on the consolidated balance sheet given that for the consolidated entity the risk of recovery would ultimately be through the utility's tariff. However, if the merchant energy company were deemed noncore and its rating was more a reflection of its stand-alone creditworthiness, Standard & Poor's would impute a debt equivalent using a 70% risk factor to its balance sheet, as well as a 30% risk-adjusted debt equivalent to the utility. Indeed, this is how the purchases would be reflected for both companies if there were no ownership relationship. This example is perhaps overly simplistic because there will be many variations on this theme. However, Standard & Poor's will apply this logic as

Table 1

ABC Utility Co. Adjustment to Capital Structure

	Original capital structure		Adjusted capital structure	
	\$	%	\$	%
Debt	1,400	54	1,400	48
Adjustment to debt	—	—	327	11
Preferred stock	200	8	200	7
Common equity	1,000	38	1,000	34
Total capitalization	2,600	100	2,927	100

Table 2

ABC Utility Co. Adjustment to Pretax Interest Coverage

	Original pretax interest coverage		Adjusted pretax interest coverage	
Net income	120			
Income taxes	65	300	(300+33)	
Interest expense	115	115	(115+33)	= 2.3x
Pretax available	300			

